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Introduction 
Empirical  evidence  is used  to determine  whether  distortions  in the nonagricul-
tural sector of the U.  S.  economy  justify,  on  efficiency criteria,  the current 
level of distortions in the agricultural sector. 
Estimates of optimal  distortions for  the  U.  S.  agricultural sector are 
provided under  the assumption  that distortions  in other sectors of the economy 
are fixed.  This  is a  standard problem of choosing  second-best policies  (the 
first best being  to remove  all distortions).  It is well  known  that,  given 
distortions in one  sector,  it is generally not optimal  to simply  remove  the 
distortions in the sector over which  the policymaker  has  discretion. 
In a  simple  two-good  model,  the distortion in one  sector can  be  chosen  to 
exactly offset  the  fixed distortion so  that the economy  faces world  relative 
prices.  This  makes  it tempting  to compare  aggregate distortions in the U.  S. 
manufacturing  and  agricultural sectors and  to argue  that,  if the former  is 
fixed,  economic  efficiency would  be  improved  by  setting the aggregate agri-
cultural distortions at the  same  level  (see Schuh;  also Chambers'  comments). 
This  would  maintain the domestic  relative aggregate price of agricultural to 
industrial goods  at the  same  level as the world  relative aggregate price. 
This proposal  ignores  the general equilibrium linkages within and  between 
sectors and  can  be  expected  to yield poor  results. 
A general  equilibrium model  which  disaggregates  the agricultural and 
manufacturing  sectors is used  to calculate optimal distortions within the 
former  taking as given  the distortions within the latter. -2-
The  producer distortions,  hereafter referred to as tariffs, are defined as 
the difference between  the producer  price and  the shadow  price of a  commodity 
in ad  valorem  form.  Although  it is clearly preferable for  policymakers  to 
consider altering both  agricultural and  nonagricultural tariffs simultane-
ously,  this seldom  occurs  in practice.  A notable example  was  the 1985  Farm 
Bill.  The  dehate  surrounding  this Bill concerned  how  to modify agricultural 
policy rather  than how  to modify  nonagricultural policy so as  to affect the 
agricultural sector.  There are many  reasons why  actual policy choices may  not 
approximate  optimal  (i.e., economically efficient) decisions,  but  it is worth 
understanding  the extent and  direction of the discrepancy.  This  understanding 
may  provide  surprising evidence  for or against certain policies. 
The  forthcoming  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs and  Trade  (GATT)  discussions 
illustrate another potential use  of the calculations performed here.  The 
United States is especially interested in reducing  international distortions 
in agricultural trade.  It is,  therefore,  important to estimate the effects of 
particular compromises  and  to measure  how  changes  in one  sector make  other 
compromises  more  or  less palatable.  For  example,  the empirical results 
indicate that a  reduction  in  the protection of the textile sector has  a 
dramatic effect on  the optimal distortion for  raw  cotton. 
The  use  of computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  models  (See  Dervis et al., 
Ballard et al., and  Whalley)  provides  the most  sophisticated method  of de-
termining  these effects.  An  alternative developed  by  Dixit and  Newbery  is 
used  in this paper.  The  advantages of this method  are its simplicity and  more 
modest  demand  on  data.  These  features  make  it possible to develop  the  em-
pirical model  quickly and  to perform sensitivity analysis that is relatively -3-
transparent.  The  method  lacks  the detail of more  general  CGE  models,  and 
there  is no  suggestion that it provides a  substitute for  these models. 
Dixit and  Newbery,  Dixit and  Norman,  a~d Dixit show  that the optimum 
tariff on  the sector in which  the policymaker  intervenes is a  weighted  average 
of the existing tariffs in the other sectors of the economy.  Dixit and 
Newbery  use  this methodology  to find  the optimum  tariff on  imported oil for 
the Turkish economy.  In our  study,  agriculture is disaggregated  into seven 
sectors,  and  the model  is extended  to determine  the optimum  vector of tariffs. 
We  used  1982  as a  reference year  because most  of the input-output and 
final  demand  data were  available for  that year.  The  existing market  dis-
tortions have  been  estimated for  the same  year.  The  results suggest  that 
lower  tariffs should  he  applied to the dairy,  cattle, hog,  sugar,  tobacco, 
and  fruits and  vegetables sectors.  More  protection  (a higher tariff) should 
be  given to oil-bearing crops and  cotton.  Optimum  tariffs for  the food  and 
feed  grains sectors are close to zero,  exposing  these  two  sectors to 
international competition. 
The  next  section describes  the Dixit-Newbery-Norman model.  The  following 
section is devoted  to the data and  the estimation of the existing distor-
tions.  The  empirical findings are then presented and  the sensitivity analysis 
is discussed.  A conclusion follows. 
Further details are provided  in three appendices which  are available upon 
request.  The  first appendix  contains a  more  detailed discussion of the Dixit-
Newbery  methodology,  the second  appendix  descrihes  the computation  of pre-
vailing distortions more  completely,  and  the third appendix gives the output 
of the sensitivity analysis. -4-
The  Model 
A Ricardo-Viner-Leontief model  and  duality theory constitute the core of the 
methodology.  The  production functions exhibit constant returns to scale, with 
labor being the only mobile  factor,  and  capital sector specific.  The  direc-
tion of bias induced by  the Ricardo-Viner assumption  in unclear.  Capital 
includes land which,  in some  cases,  is clearly not sector specific;  on  the 
other hand,  labor mobility is not perfect.  The  model  is defended as an 
approximation which  makes  the empirical analysis tractable. 
We  initially take world prices to be  exogenous  but later relax this 
assumption.  There  is no  formal  consideration of retaliation by  U.  S.  trading 
partners to changes  in U.  S.  policy.  However,  a  range of rest-of-the-world 
elasticities of excess demand  for U.  S.  products provides an ad  hoc  way  to 
incorporate different conjectured changes  in the rest-of-the-lvorld policies. 
Demand  is represented by  a  single consumer  having a  Cobb-Douglas  utility 
function,  u, with an associated expenditure function,  e.  This assumption of a 
single consumer  is not restrictive since we  are concerned with efficiency and 
not distributional questions.  Any  change  in government  revenues can be re-
distributed in a  nondistortionary way  through  lump-sum  transfers.  Production 
is characterized by  a  revenue  function,  r.  There are m traded goods  and  1 
nontraded ones.  Domestically produced and  foreign-traded goods  are assumed 
perfect substitutes (this is in contrast to CGE  models,  which  use an Armington 
structure) • 
(1) 
The  accounting  identity for this economy  is given by 
e(p +  t  +  c, q  +  b,  u)  = rep + t, q)  +  (t +  c)  •  e  p 
n 
+  b  •  e  - t  •  r  - p  •  g  - q  •  g  q  p -5-
where  p is the vector of world prices;  t  is the vector of tariffs;  q is the 
vector of producer prices for the nontraded goods;  c  ~nd b are the vectors 
of consumer  taxes applied on  traded and  nontraded goods,  respectively;  ep 
and  e  are the gradients of the expenditure function with respect to p and 
q 
q;  rp  is the gradient of the revenue  function with respect to p;  and  g and 
gn  are the vectors of government  consumption of traded and  nontraded  goods. 
The  vector of excess supply of nontraded goods,  z, must  be  equal  to zero at 
equilibrium or 
(2) 
where  rq is the gradient of the revenue  function with respect to q.  Differ-
entiating totally (1)  and  (2), holding b,  g,  gn constant,  and  eliminating dq 
yields 
(3) 
B •  du  = [(t +  c)  G  Epp  +  (b  +  h)  •  Eqp  - t  •  ~p - h  0  Rqp]  •  dt' 
+  [(t +  c)  •  E  +  (b  +  h)  •  E  ]. dc'  pp  qp 
where  B is a  positive scalar;  h  is the vector of the differences between the 
producer price and  shadow  price for nontraded goods;  E  is the Hessian  pp 
submatrix of the expenditure function corresponding to the traded goods 
(d2e/dpdp');  and  E  is the Hessian submatrix for the cross derivatives  .  qp 
of e  with respect to q and  p.  Similarly, Rand R  are the Hessian sub- pp  qp 
matrices of the revenue  function  (d2r/dpdp'  and  d2r/dqdp').  The  vector h  is 
(4)  h = [(t +  c)  •  E  +  b  • E  - t  •  R  ]  •  Z -1  pq  qq  pq  q 
where  Zq  is the matrix dz/dq. -6-
Assume  the po1icymaker  can change  taxes and  tariffs in the first n traded 
sectors,  holding taxes and  tariffs constant in the other sectors,  and  define 
t* and  c*  as the vectors of optimum  tariffs and  taxes (i.e., t  = [t*:  t(-n)] 
and  c  = [c*:  c(-n)]  where  t(-n) and  c(-n)  give  the last m - n  elements of t 
and  c, respectively).  The  optimum  t* and  c*  are given by: 
(5)  B •  du/dt* = 0 = (t +  c)  •  Epn  +  (b  +  h)  •  Eqn  - t  •  Rpn  - h  •  Rqn 
and 
(6)  B  •  du/dc* = 0 = (t +  c)  •  Epn  +  (b  +  h)  •  Eqn 
where  E  is (d2d/dp.  dp.)  and  R  is (d2r/dp.  dp.),  for  i  = 1,  ...  ,  m and  pn  1  J  pn  1  J 
j  = 1,  .•. ,  n;  Eqn  is (d2e/dQk dPj)  and  Rqn  is (d2r/dQk dpj)'  for k = 1,  .•. ,  1 
and  j  = 1,  ••• ,  n.  Subtract (6)  from  (5)  to obtain the·vector of optimum 
tariffs,  t*: 
(7)  t* = -[t(-n)  • R  +  h  R  ]  R  -1  mn  •  qn  •  nn 
where  R  is (d2r/dp  dp.)  for w = n  +  1,  ••• ,  m,  and  j  = 1, ...  ,  n;  mn  w  J 
and R  is the square matrix  (d2r/dp.  dp.)  for  i  and  j  = 1,  ••. ,  n. 
M  1  J 
Equation  (7)  expresses the optimum  tariffs as a  weighted average of the 
existing distortions,  t(-m)  and  h,  in the remaining sectors. 
Substituting (7)  into (6) yields: 
(8)  c*  = -t* - {[c(-n)  +  t(-n)]  •  E  +  (b  +  h)  •  E  }. E  -1  mn  qn  M 
where  Emn  and  Enn  are the counterparts of Rmn  and  Rnn  for the expenditure 
function.  According  to (8),  the optimum  conSl~er tax should be  the negative 
of the optimum  tariff minus  a  correction term accounting  for  the distortions 
in the other sectors •. In the case of the Cobb-Douglas  utility function,  it -7-
can be  sholin  that the correction term  is just a  weighted average of the sums 
of the tariff and  consumer  tax applied to each of the remaining  sectors, 
weighted  by  the expenditure shares. 
The  values of t* and  c*  can be  computed  by  solving the system of 
equations (4),  (7), and  (8).  Even  given the assumption of the model,  these 
values are only approximations  to the optimal  levels.  The  reason is that 
equations (4),  (7),  and  (8)  involve the Hessian of the revenue  function,  which 
is evaluated at a  point  using current data (Dixit and  Newbery).  This Hessian 
gives own- and  cross-price effects on  supply.  In calculating the optimal 
distortions,  the Hessian is taken as constant;  however,  the underlying model 
implies that the Hessian varies with price.  This suggests the following 
iterative approach:  Calculate the optimal distortions as above  and  then 
recompute  the Hessian evaluated at the new  prices;  recalculate the optimum 
distortions using the updated Hessian and  proceed to convergence.  This method 
is not practical since calculation of the Hessian at the new  set of prices 
requires additional assumptions  which  specify how  the shadow  value of labor 
and  labor demand  change  as price changes. 
As  is typically the case with general equilibrium models,  costs of 
adjustment are ignored (see Baldwin et ale  for an  exception).  These costs may 
be  significant--in which  case the computed  optimum  should be  regarded as a 
long-run target and  not as a  recommendation  for an  immediate  and  radical 
change. 
Before proceeding with the data and  the results,  we  repeat several 
features of the model: 
1.  Capital is fixed  and  labor is mobile. 
2.  Domestic  and  foreign tradables are perfect substituteso -8-
3.  Strategic considerations (e.g., possible retaliations) are 
obscured. 
4.  The  computation of optimal distortions  involves an 
approximation. 
S.  There  is no  cost of adjustment or other source of dynamics. 
It is worth keeping  in mind  these five features  in evaluating the results. 
The  Data 
The  estimation of the Hessian of the revenue  function requires  the knowledge 
of input-output and  value-added data.  We  used  the 41  sectors data set of 
Adelman  and  Robinson,  aggregated to 38  sectors.  The  data set gives the 
input-output table and  value-added matrix for the year 1982.  We  took  some 
value-added data from  the U.  S.  Department  of Commerce  because  some  sectors 
showed  a  negative capital income  for 1982.  The  share of labor  income  in the 
value added  of sectors 11  and  28  was  estimated using the data of this latter 
source. 
Elasticities of substitution between  labor and capital are also needed  for 
the estimation.  The  estimated elasticities corne  from  Whalley.  The  Hessian of 
the expenditure function is calculated using expenditure shares and  total 
expenditure.  We  used the 1982  final demand  data of Adelman  and  Robinson. 
Total expenditure is the sum  of private consumption and  investment.  The 
shares are the ratio of the expenditure for each sector divided by  total 
expenditure. 
The  vector of consumption  taxes is estimated by  the vector of "total 
indirect business taxes" paid by  each sector which  appears  in the value-added 
data of Adelman  and  Robinson.  These  taxes are divided by  the value of total -9-
output of each sector to obtain an ad  valorem equivalent.  These  tax rates 
underestimate the true consumption  tax rates because  they do  not  include sales 
taxes.  The  effect·of this underestimation is investigated in the sensitivity 
analysis. 
The  tariffs for  the agricultural sectors are computed  using weighted 
averages of nominal  protection ratios1 adjusted for transportation cost. 
The  price data come  from  the U.  S.  Department  of Agriculture  (1983,  1985),  the 
World  Bank,  the Commodity  Research  Bureau,  the U.  N.  Conference  on  Trade and 
Development,  Duncan,  and  Finger and  Yeats.  The  tariffs for the manufacturing 
sectors are based  on  Morici  and  Megna.  They  estimated ad valorem equivalents 
of the different producer  subsidies in manufacturing for the year 1976.  Cus-
tom  duties for 1982  are also available from  the U.  S.  International Trade 
Commission.  The  duties and  subsidies,  in ad  valorem  form,  are aggregated  to 
approximate  the tariffs for the manufacturing sectors. 
The  difference between  producer price and  shadow  prices are calculated 
following the Dixit-Norman methodology  [see equation (AS)  in Dixit and 
Newbery].  Total output,  expenditure shares,  shares of labor  income  in value 
added,  ratios of value added  to output, and  the sector nomenclature are 
contained in table 1.  The  estimated elasticities of substitution, existing 
tariffs,and existing consumer  tax rates are presented in table 2. 
The  Results 
The  computed  optimum  tariffs and  consumer  taxes for  the seven agricultural 
sectors are shown  in table 3.  The  results suggest  that the price support to 
the "dairy, poultry,  and  eggs" sector should be  decreased  from  the existing 
level of 26.02  percent to the optimum  tariff of 2.98  percent.  Similarly, the 
tariff on  the "meat  and  livestock" sector should be  lowered  to 2.77  percent. -10-
TABLE  1  BASIC  DATA 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------~~ 
1  ddiry,poultry&eggs 
2  me3t&livestocl~ 
3  fo~:i  gr'lins 
4  feed  gr3ins,gr~ss seeds 
5  cotton,oil  b=~ring croos 
6  fruits,veg.,tree nuts 
7  tobacco,sugar,other  3f, 
8  metal,co31  non-met.  mining 
9  crude  pet.,gas 
10  construction * 
11  muni tions 
12  food,bev.tobac.orod. 
13  textiles 
14  ;'lpparel 
15  wood,wood  pro. 
16  p3p~r,p3per pro.,publish. 
17  chemical,che~ic31 pro. 
18  petroleum,pet.  prod. 
19  leather,leath.  pro. 
20  non-metallic  mineral  pro. 
21  iron,steel 
22  non-ferr.ous  metnls 
23  metal  products 
24  f3rr:t  equip. ,motor  v~h. 
25  m::lchincry 
26  co~putin~,rqdio TV  com.  equip 
27  electric~l m3chinery 
28  aircr~ft,oth~r  tr~nsportat. 
29  Transport~tion,communicat. * 
30  electricity,gas,water * 
31  wls~le,ret3il  trade 
32  banking,insur~nce * 
33  real  est3te * 
34  hotel,person~l serv.,eating * 
35  business  services 
36  Health,  educ.,soc.  services * 
37  fed.,st3te,locnl  enterprises * 
38  other  industry 
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The  units  for  gross  output  ~re  sue:;  th~t  th~  19~2 prices  nre  equ:1l  to  ~1  per  unit. -11-
TABLS  2  EXISTING  DISTORTIONS  AND  ELASTICITIES 
1  d3iry,poultry&e~gs 
2  m@~t&livQstock 
el~sticjty of  sub. 
n.60 
3  foo:1  gr:lins 
4  feed  cr3ins,gr3ss  seeds 
5  cotton,oil  b~qring crops 
6  frui ts,  vee. ,tree  nu ts 
7  tob~cco,su~ar,othe~ ag 
q  metal,coql  non-m~t.  minin~ 
9  crude  pet.,g~s 
10  construction * 
11  muni tions 
12  food,bev.tob3c.prod. 
13  textiles 
14  apP3rcl 
15  wood,wood  pro. 
16  paper,paper  pro.,publish. 
17  chemical,ch2mical  pro. 
18  petrolcu~,p~t.  prod. 
19  leather,leath.  pro. 
20  non-met3llic  mineral  pro. 
21  iron,steel 
22  non-ferrous metals 
23  met3l  products 
24  farm  equip.,motor  veh. 
25  m."lchinery 
26  computing,radio  TV  com.  equip 
27  electrical  m~chinery 
23  aircraft,other  transportnt. 
29  Transport3tion,communic~t. * 
30  electricity,gas,w~t~r * 
31  wlsalc,ret~il  trnde 
32  bsnking,insurance * 
33  real  estate * 
34  hotel,person"ll  serv.,eatin~ * 
35  business  services 
36  Heslth,  educ.,soc.  services * 
37  fed.,st~te,locnl enterprises * 































1.  0') 
1.00 
1.00 
1.  0') 
1.  0') 
1.0') 
1.00 











































































•  I  . 




* The  ~qriffs  for  the  non-tr3ded  sectors  qre  computed  ,t the  optimu~ 
tariffs  and  con~u~ption  t"lxes  of  T,ble  ~ -12-
TABLE  3  OPTP1U~l TARIFFS  A~;T)  :O:ISU'!PTT.Q'!  TAXES 
sec tor 
1  dairy,poultry 
2  me~t livestock 
3  food  ;;rains 
4  fe~j er:1ins 
5  cotton,oil  be~rin~ crops 
6  fruits,ve3. 
7  tobacco,su~~r,other. 
















The  optimum  producer price level of the food  and  feed grains sector is 
close to the prevailing level  in 1982.  The  protection of the fifth sector 
(cotton and  oil-bearing crops)  should be  increased significantly to 49  per-
cent.  The  opposite conclusions are reached  for  the last two  sectors.  For  the 
"fruits and  vegetables" sector,  the tariff should be  reduced to 3.81  percent; 
the price support to the "tobacco,  sugar,  and  other agriculture" sectors 
should be  lowered  to 3.33 percent. 
The  aggregation scheme  in the Adelman  and  Robinson  data does  not allow us 
to determine the optimum  protection on  a  commodity  base.  There  is not any 
obvious  rule to translate the optimum  tariff of a  subsector into a  set of 
optimum  tariffs for each commodity  within that subsector.  The  only rigorous 
way  to proceed would  be  to use  a  disaggregated data set commodity  by  commodity. 
Our  findings are quite robust to sensitivity analysis.  This analysis is 
centered on  (1)  the elasticities of substitution,  (2)  the existing consumer 
tax rates,  (3)  the small-country assumption,  (4)  the share of labor income  in 
value added,  and  (5)  the ratio of value added  to output. 
For  the elasticities of substitution,  we  consider five scenarios:  First, 
a  Cobb-Douglas  world  is assumed  with all elasticities set equal  to one;  then 
two  extreme cases are examined  with all the elasticities of substitution equal 
to  .05  and  5,  respectively.  We  also consider two  cases where  we  take the 
original vector of elasticities of substitution and  change  the value of the 
last 11  sectors.  Whalley  set these values to I  because of lack of estimates 
(see table 2).  First, we  set the last 11  elasticities to  .05  and  then we 
increase them  to s.  All  the tendencies described above  hold  through  the five 
simulations.  The  magnitudes of the optimum  tariffs do  not vary substantially 
except  for the fifth sector (cotton and  oil-bearing crops)  for which  the -14-
optimal tariff drops  from  49  percent to 34  percent in the case of the very low 
elasticities of substitution (.05).  The  complete  results are presented in 
appendices 3.3, 3.6, 3.9, 3.12,  and  3.13 \vhich,  along with the other appen-
dixes mentioned below,  are available upon  request. 
The  second part of the sensitivity analysis concerns  the underestimation 
of the consumer  tax rates.  The  estimates do  not  include sales taxes and  are 
biased downward.  The  tax rates of table 2 are scaled up  by  20  and  SO  percent 
to determine the impact  of their probable underestimation.  The  optimum  con-
sumption  taxes are increased by  approximately 1  cent per dollar (20  percent 
case) and  3 cents per dollar  (SO  percent case).  The  optimum  tariffs are 
almost  invariant to the changes  in the consumer  tax rates.  We  report  the 
results in appendicies 3.1,3.2,3.4,3.5,3.7,3.8,3.10, and  3.11. 
The  small-country assumption is relaxed for three of the agricultural 
sectors (food,  feed  grains, and  cotton and  oil-bearing crops).  We  use Dixit, 
modified to take into account  the nontraded sectors,  to endogenize prices for 
these commodities.  Several cases are considered.  For  each scenario,  cross-
price elasticities are set to zero and  all commodities  have  the same  olin-price 
elasticity.  First, it is assumed  that the elasticities of export demand  for 
the three sectors are very high  (-100  for the three sectors),  then their 
values are progressively decreased  (-SO,  -5,  -2,  and  -1).  The  results do 
not change  substantially for  the cases of high elasticities (-100)  since the 
small-country assumption is virtually unchanged  for these values.  The  optimum 
tariffs are different when  we  assume  that the export demand  elasticities are 
lower  (-5,  -2,  -1).  Tariffs decrease significantly and  become  negative as the 
world demands  for  the three sectors become  less elastic; that is, it becomes 
optimal  to exercise market power  by  means  of an export tax.  In the extreme -15-
case of unit elasticity of \vorld  demand,  the tariffs on  food  and  feed grains 
and  cotton and  oil-bearing crops are -98  percent,  -99  percent,  and  -51  per-
cent.  The  detailed results are in appendicies 3.16 to 3.20. 
In a  partial equilibrium framework,  the optimum  export tax is the  inverse 
of the elasticity of export demand  for the commodity  considered.  This result 
holds in a  general  equilibrium approach when  all existing distortions are 
assumed  equal to zero and  when  only own-price elasticities of export demand 
are considered  (see appendix 3.22).  The  U.  S.  Department  of Agriculture 
(1986)  surveys the existing estimates of world  demand  elasticities for U.  S. 
agricultural exports.  According  to that study,  there is no  consensus  on  the 
real magnitude  of the elasticities.  Johnson  reports values up  to 10.18  for 
feed grains,  6.72  for wheat,  and  5.5  for cotton.  However,  Bredahl  et al. 
compute  lower elasticities.  We  can conclude that the optimum  tariffs pre-
sented in table 3 are an  upper  bound  for the "true" optimum  tariffs for sec-
tors 3, 4,  and  5  (unless cross-price effects dominate).  Other  simulations are 
performed combining  variations in elasticities of export demand  and  of subs-
titution.  These combinations do  not bring significant changes  (the results 
are reported in appendices 3.14 and  3.15). 
The  persistence of a  high optimal tariff for the cotton and  oil-bearing 
crops suggests that the high degree of protection of the textile industry 
determines the optimum  tariff on  raw  cotton via the input-output coef-
ficients.  Similarly,  the existing tariff on  food  and  beverage affects the 
optimal tariff on  oil-bearing crops suggests e  tariff on  textile (sector 13) 
is decreased by  50  percent,  the optimal tariff on  cotton and  oil-bearing crops 
drops  to 17  percent;  conversely,  when  it is increased by  50  percent,  the 
optimum  tariff on  cotton rises to 80  percent.  This conclusion carries through -16-
when  the world prices of sectors 3,  4,  and  5 are endogenous  (see appendices 
3.29  to 3.34  for detailed results).  We  perform the same  analysis for sector 
12  (food and  beverage).  ·When  the existing tariff on  sector 12  is decreased 
by  50  percent,  the optimum  tariff on  cotton and  oil-bearing crops falls to 
41  percent;  the optimum  tariff on  feed grains falls to -11  percent  (an export 
tax).  That  is, a  fall in the effective rate of protection of sector 12  caused 
by  a  decrease in the tariff on  that sector should be  partly offset by  a  de-
crease in the price of inputs.  The  tariffs on  each of the other agricultural 
sectors are also decreased but to a  lesser extent  (appendices 3.23 to 3.28 
contain the detailed results).  Small  changes  in the share of labor  income  in 
value added  do  not cause significant changes  in the results (see appendix 
3.21).  This simulation examines  the  impact  of an  increase of the share of the 
mobile  factor of production. 
An  attempt was  made  to determine the effect on  production and  trade of 
changing the current distortions.  The  Hessian of the revenue  function,  used 
to calculate the optimal distortions, was  used  to construct own- and  cross-
price elasticities of supply at 1982  prices.  These elasticities were  used to 
generate constant elasticity supply curves.  The  revenue  function implied by 
the model  does not lead to constant elasticity supply curves,  so the estimates 
we  report are only suggestive.  Construction of the actual supply curves 
implied by  the model  requires the ability to calculate the Hessian of the 
revenue  function at points other than at the observed prices.  As  discussed in 
a  previous section,  we  are unable to do  this. 
The  predicted levels of output,  consumption,  and  net exports--using the 
constant elasticity of supply curves and  the tariffs and  taxes given in 
table 3--are presented in the first three columns  of table 4.  The  fourth 
column  gives the existing (1982)  level of net exports.  The  predictions -17-
TAnL~ 4  p:u:nI:TSD  G!t()SS  ~WTPUT  OJNSU~IPTI()~l  A~!:l  'lET  ;:XP81T  l]NDE1  NE'.l  TNUFFS 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------~~~~ 
1  dairy,poultry~c~gs 
2  me~t&livestock 
3  food  grains 
4  feed  grains,grass  seeds 
5  cotton,oil  b2~ring crops 
6  fruits,veg.,tree  nuts 
7  tob3cco,sug~r,other 3g 
8  met31,coal  non-met.  mining 
9  crude  pe t.  ,gelS 
10  construction * 
11  munitions 
12  food,bev.tobac.prod. 
13  textiles 
14  apP.lrel 
15  '..Tood, 1100d  pro. 
16  paper,p~per  pro.,publis~. 
17  chemical,chemical  pro. 
18  petroleu~,pet.  prod. 
19  leather,le,th.  ~ro. 
2Q  non-met~llic miner,l  pro. 
- 21  iron,steel 
22  non-ferrous  metals 
23  metal  products 
24  farm  equip.,motor veh. 
25  machinery 
25  co:nputing,r~dio TV  co:;!.  equiD 
27  electric~l  m~chinery 
23  aircraft,other  transport~t. 
29  Transport3tion,co:nmunic~t. * 
30  electricity,gns,w~ter * 
31  wlsale,ret~il  trade 
32  bsnking,insurance * 
33  real  es ta te * 
34  hotcl,personql  serv.,enting * 
35  business  services 
36  Health,  educ.,so=.  services * 
37  fed.,st3te,10ccl  enterprises * 
33  other  industry 
predict. 
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The  units  3re  such  th~t  th~  1932  prices  :Jr·-- :~qu31  to  'S1  ner  unit. -18-
indicate that, under  the optimal distortions,  the United States would  change 
from  being a net exporter to being a  net  importer of dairy,  poultry,  and 
eggs.  Meat  and  livestock imports would  increase by  a  factor of almost  10; 
exports of feed  grains would  increase by  a  factor of 3.  There would  be  rela-
tively little change  in exports of cotton and  oil-bearing crops  (despite the 
increased tariff in that sector), but textile imports would  increase by  a 
factor of more  than 10.  This reflects the fact that an increase in the 
protection of raw  cotton decreases the effective protection of the textile 
industry.  There would  be  a  sixfold increase in the  imports of fruits and 
vegetables and  an eightfold increase in tobacco and  sugar  imports.  This would 
change  the United States from  an  importer to an exporter of food,  beverage, 
and  tobacco products.  These  effects are very intuitive,  given the  c~anges in 
the distortions.  There are,  in addition,  several anomalous  results regarding 
nonagricultural sectors (table 4,  rows  15,  16,  23,  and  26);  it is not  uncommon 
for general equilibrium models  to yield such results. 
Conclusion 
This  study was  motivated by  asking whether  existing (1982)  distortions in the 
nonagricultural sectors justify the current  (1982)  level of distortions in the 
agricultural sectors.  Since there is no  theoretical basis for answering  this 
question,  we  have  attempted to provide empirical evidence.  This evidence must 
be  interpreted cautiously due  to reasons given above.  However,  the extensive 
sensitivity analysis suggests that the results provide at least a  rough 
guide.  The  conclusion is that for  four  subsectors--which include dairy, 
poultry and  eggs,  meat  and  livestock,  fruit and  vegetables,  and  tobacco and 
sugar--the existing distortions cannot be  justified on  efficiency criteria. -19-
For  two  subsectors, which  include food  and  feed  grains,  the existing distor-
tion, which  is quite low,  is approximatively optimal. 
For  one  subsector,  comprising cotton and  oil-bearing crops,  the existing 
distortion should be  greatly increased.  Both  consumers  and  producers of these 
commodities  should be  subsidized.  This result is due  to the existing protec-
tion of the textile and  food  and  beverage  industries.  Decreases  in the tariff 
on  these  industries should be  translated into a  decrease in the optimal  level 
of protection of the raw  cotton sector. 
The  analysis uses economic  efficiency as the sole criteria.  This  is not 
to suggest that distributional issues are unimportant.  Indeed,  the estimates 
of changes  in production and  trade induced by  changes  in the distortions sug-
gest that the distributional issues may  be  significant.  This observation is 
reinforced by  the fact that the analysis  ignores adjustment costs lvhich  in-
crease the burden and  decrease the benefits of proposed changes. 
Despite these qualifications,  there remains  the  important conclusion that 
levels of protection of the most  highly protected agricultural commodities are 
not justified by  efficiency criteria. -20-
Footnotes 
*We  would  like to thank Sherman  Robinson,  Elisabeth Sadoulet,  and 
participants of a  seminar at North Carolina State University for their 
comments.  The  usual disclaimer applies. 
lThe  nominal  protection ratio is equal  to the difference between  the 
producer price and  the border price of a  given commodity,  divided by  the 
border price. -21-
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